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Brexit and Europe
In the wake of  the referendum on the withdrawal of  the UK from the EU, 
much of  the discussion has focused on 
the procedural details of  Article 50 and 
whether the UK can retain access to the 
single European market.
Both are critically important. And 
negotiating trade deals with the EU and 
other countries should top the political 
agenda. But important as market access 
is, the EU has a much broader role. It 
is therefore imperative to also examine 
other policy areas and think about ways 
to make the separation work.
EU foreign policy cooperation 
has received little attention since 
the referendum. The Brexiters have 
repeated time and again that ‘we still 
have NATO’ and so there is nothing to 
worry about. At the same time, Defence 
Secretary Michael Fallon – a Bremainer 
– noted on 19 July that the UK can 
continue to participate in EU military 
operations as a non-EU country. But 
such superficial statements do not really 
give sufficient consideration to the 
challenge that Brexit actually presents.
The discussion over the UK’s 
relationship with EU foreign policy 
will be a difficult one, particularly 
because it is so political. The UK 
has traditionally been sceptical of  an 
integrated EU foreign policy, so it is 
possible it may choose not to pursue 
continued cooperation. The ambiguous 
concept of  British ‘sovereignty’ also 
played a key role in the Brexit debate: 
overblown fears about the potential 
creation of  an EU army worried even 
some Bremainers. 
Yet on a day-to-day basis, at the 
micro as well as at the macro level, 
a coordinated EU foreign policy has 
been able to get things done. This 
was acknowledged in the coalition 
government’s July 2013 review of  the 
balance of  competences between the 
UK and the EU on foreign policy: 
‘The majority of  the evidence we 
received argued that it was generally 
strongly in the UK’s interests to work 
through the EU in foreign policy.’ 
Rather than breaking off  all foreign 
policy ties, it would appear to be in 
Britain’s interests for it to think about 
how to continue interaction.
If Britain were cut out of EU 
foreign policy coordination 
meetings it would be a 
tremendous loss for both 
the EU and the UK
As a starting point, it is worth 
pointing out that EU foreign policy 
cooperation was established in the 1970s 
as an informal platform for ministers 
and diplomats to exchange views and 
share information. In his authoritative 
1992 account of  the evolution of  
European foreign policy, Simon Nuttall, 
then a British civil servant working for 
the European Commission, likened 
European Political Cooperation, as it 
was called at the time, to ‘a private club, 
operated by diplomats, for diplomats’.
While the initial ambition was for 
the six European foreign ministers to 
take part in an exclusive retreat twice 
a year (and for their political directors 
four times a year), the amount of  
consultation increased rapidly. Today, 
EU foreign ministers meet every 
month in the Foreign Affairs Council 
in Brussels, while ambassadors and 
diplomats meet daily in a range of  
permanent committees.
In addition to this continued 
exchange in Brussels, European 
diplomats also participate in 
coordination meetings in countries and 
international organisations around the 
world. From Washington to Moscow 
to Beijing, European diplomats meet 
continually in the offices of  EU 
delegations. At the UN in New York, 
for instance, there are thousands of  
annual intra-EU meetings. Diplomats 
from EU member states often meet in 
the morning, before negotiating with 
their UN counterparts later in the day.
The risk of  Brexit is that the 
UK would be completely cut out of  
these EU foreign policy coordination 
meetings. This would be a tremendous 
loss for both the EU and the UK. The 
UK has one of  the best diplomatic 
networks in the world and therefore 
occupies a privileged position. The 
process of  sharing its information and 
views with the other member states 
enables the UK to canvass support for 
its positions, while British diplomats 
also benefit from hearing what the 
French, Germans and others have to 
say on any given topic.
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In addition to exchanging views, 
EU member states also make joint 
statements and adopt common 
positions on a wide range of  
international events. After Brexit, the 
UK would naturally want to issue its 
own statements on global events (as it 
does today). But beyond the headlines, 
the EU also adopts various positions 
and issues statements. And the question 
is how the UK will relate to them. The 
EU currently allows non-EU states 
(such as candidate countries) to ‘align’ 
themselves with EU positions, but they 
do not have any input. It would be 
strange if  the UK, as a major diplomatic 
actor, were meekly to align itself  post 
hoc with EU positions that had been 
debated and agreed in its absence.
It is also striking that EU actors, 
such as High Representative Federica 
Mogherini, increasingly negotiate on 
behalf  of  EU member states. The high 
representative participates, for instance, 
in the Middle East Quartet with the 
US and Russia. Mogherini and her civil 
servants were also the key negotiators 
on the non-proliferation agreement 
recently concluded with Iran. They also 
negotiated normalisation deals between 
Serbia and Kosovo.
These are important international 
diplomatic negotiations, which the UK 
is currently able to significantly shape by 
providing input and formal control, and 
about which it receives ongoing briefs. 
Brexit would reduce the UK’s input and 
all but end its control over such high-
level diplomacy. Yet Brexit would also 
be harmful for EU diplomatic efforts. 
The high representative would, for 
instance, have more credibility if  she 
spoke on behalf  of  the EU with the UK 
rather than the EU without the UK. 
It is clear that a full withdrawal of  
the UK from the area of  EU foreign 
policy cooperation would be a major 
setback for both the UK and the EU. 
Completely ignoring EU foreign policy 
during the exit negotiations – to find that 
all ties are cut at the end of  the process 
– is therefore undesirable. Naturally, it is 
also clear that, for political reasons, the 
UK cannot continue to participate as if  
nothing has changed. Furthermore, the 
remaining EU member states may want 
to move forward on certain aspects of  
EU foreign policy, whether or not the 
UK is involved. 
But it does not have to be a 
simple ‘in’ or ‘out’. Once again, it is 
worth looking back at the informal 
arrangements of  the 1970s and 1980s. 
European Political Cooperation was 
kept entirely separate from economic 
cooperation, precisely because it was 
recognised as different and much more 
sensitive. In this spirit, it should not 
be too difficult to consider a number 
of  informal mechanisms which would 
enable this cooperation to continue.
One obvious possibility is that 
the UK foreign secretary continues to 
attend the Foreign Affairs Council, if  
not monthly, then perhaps four times a 
year. To make this appear more palatable 
to both the EU and the UK, the council 
could meet in an ‘EU+ format’ with 
participants consisting of  the EU, 
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) members and the UK. The 
foreign secretary (and the defence 
secretary) could also attend informal 
meetings of  the Foreign Affairs Council 
(following what is referred to as the 
Gymnich format, where meetings have 
an agenda but no formal decisions) 
as well as those formal meetings 
where decisions are taken on security 
operations with British contributions.
Naturally, such arrangements would 
require political will on the part of  both 
the EU and the UK, but it is worth 
pointing to several precedents. During 
the NATO operation in Afghanistan, 
the North Atlantic Council regularly 
met in ‘ISAF (the International Security 
Assistance Force) format’ with all the 
troop-contributing countries (51 in 
total) around the table. Furthermore, 
the NATO secretary general regularly 
attends the Foreign Affairs Council, as 
did US Secretary of  State John Kerry 
on 18 July. 
Opening up the EU Foreign 
Affairs Council should therefore be 
discussed. Beyond this it should not be 
too difficult to invite British diplomats 
to EU foreign affairs coordination 
meetings in Brussels and across the 
world. Particularly in third countries, far 
away from Brussels, local EU diplomats 
should be accorded some discretion. 
Finally, the UK should seriously 
consider continuing to second staff  
members to the European External 
Action Service, since such exchanges 
are mutually beneficial.
While much can be done 
informally, the EU and UK should 
also consider formal arrangements for 
consultation and British participation 
in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). As the EU continues 
to deploy autonomous civilian and 
Royal Marines from HMS Bulwark help rescue migrants stranded on a boat off the coast of Libya as part of 
the EU’s Operation Sophia. Courtesy of Rowan Griffiths/Daily Mirror/PA Archive/Press Association Images. 
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Sanctions on Russia
military operations, it would be good 
to keep the UK on board. While the 
actual contribution of  the UK in 
the CSDP has been limited in recent 
years, it nonetheless brings significant 
experience to this relatively new policy 
area.
As has been observed, including 
by Fallon, the UK can continue to 
participate in CSDP missions as a 
non-EU country. Yet this is not ideal. 
Troop contributions from non-member 
states are only sought after plans have 
been established. In other words, non-
EU countries do not have much influence 
over the mandate or the objectives of  a 
mission. For both symbolic and practical 
reasons, non-member states cannot take 
command roles, which means that the 
EU would lose access to the UK military 
headquarters in Northwood.
It would therefore be much better 
if  the UK (and the EFTA countries) 
were to be granted a formal seat 
(without a formal veto) on the Political 
and Security Committee at ambassador-
level when CSDP missions are 
discussed. This would provide the UK 
with significant input and would allow it 
to contribute more extensively. It would 
be helpful if  the UK were to continue 
to second a couple of  staff  members to 
EU planning bodies.
These are only some of  the 
challenges that Brexit presents in the 
area of  EU foreign policy. While the 
current focus seems to be on internal 
market access and free trade, the EU is 
much broader in scope and aspiration. 
While it is already clear that Brexit will 
likely be harmful for both the EU and 
the UK in terms of  individual policy 
areas, Britain’s traditionally strong role 
in foreign policy makes it particularly 
important to acknowledge the potential 
consequences of  Brexit for EU foreign 
policy. 
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Sanctions on Russia: Moscow’s Attempt to 
Soften the Blow 
Ahmed Mehdi
Despite attempts by Russia to create mechanisms to soften the impact of 
‘targeted’ financial and energy sanctions, full reintegration, even in a scenario 
of future divergence between the US and the EU, will be difficult to achieve. 
Sanctions, like other tools of  financial warfare, have increasingly become 
the weapon of  choice in both US and 
EU foreign policy. Sanctions against 
Iran, some of  the most sophisticated in 
recent decades, have been touted as a key 
success. The considerable costs inflicted 
on the country by coordinated US and 
EU sanctions were directed against the 
banking, financial and energy sectors. 
These included a cut-off  from SWIFT’s 
(Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications) global 
financial messaging service, an EU 
embargo on Iran oil exports and asset 
freezes. 
The measures have been crucial in 
convincing Tehran about the need for 
engagement. This led to an agreement 
on the country’s nuclear programme 
last year.
Alongside Iran, ongoing sanctions 
against Russia are among the most 
complex in operation. Notwithstanding 
a few carve-outs, both capital market 
and energy-related sanctions have 
prompted Russia to create a number 
of  mechanisms to adapt to the short-
term costs these have caused. Moscow 
has deployed a number of  strategies, 
including increased support from 
Russia’s central bank, identifying 
new sources of  liquidity to support 
sanctioned firms, exploiting Russia’s 
energy relationship with EU customers 
and leveraging the fallout of  wider 
geopolitical shocks such as political 
fragmentation within the EU and 
the Syria crisis. However, Russia has 
not fully succeeded in mitigating the 
damage of  sanctions, which have 
generated complications for Moscow’s 
eventual reintegration into both energy 
and financial markets. 
In a speech delivered in November 
2014, US Under Secretary of  the 
Treasury for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence David S Cohen claimed 
that the sanctions against Russia were 
designed to be ‘targeted’, reflecting 
both the size of  Russia’s economy 
(substantially larger than Iran’s in 
2009, at the height of  international 
action against Tehran) as well as the 
need to provide ‘sufficient’ pressure 
on Moscow’s calculations in Ukraine, 
without causing volatile ‘risk[s] 
